Let Rabbi Avina lift his basket and go to Rav Huna his teacher, as in order to acquire the item he must rely on the opinion of his teacher, as Rav Huna said: The legal status of one’s bill of divorce is like that of his gift. Just as with regard to a gift given by one on his deathbed, if he recovered from his illness and arose from his deathbed, he revokes his gift, so too, with regard to his bill of divorce given by one on his deathbed, if he recovered from his illness and arose from his deathbed, he revokes the bill of divorce.

And just as with regard to the bill of divorce of one on his deathbed, even though he did not specify, once he said: Write the bill of divorce, even though he did not say: Give it to my wife, they write and give it to his wife, as it was taught in the mishna. So too, with regard to a gift given by one on his deathbed, once he said: Give the gift, even though the recipients did not acquire the item from him by means of an act of acquisition, the one on his deathbed has given the gift. Based on the parallel drawn by Rav Huna between a bill of divorce and a gift, Rabbi Avina can go and collect the gift given him by Geneiva.

Rabbi Abba objects to that conclusion. If that parallel is valid, extend it and say: Just as a gift is valid after death, so too, a bill of divorce is valid after death. The Gemara rejects this: How can these cases be compared? Granted, a gift is valid after death; however, is a bill of divorce valid after death? A bill of divorce severs the bond between husband and wife. After the husband dies, the bill of divorce is pointless. Therefore, the parallel certainly does not extend to after death.

Rather, this is what is difficult according to Rabbi Abba: Geneiva’s instruction is the gift of a person on his deathbed of a portion of his estate, and the gift of a person on his deathbed of a portion of his estate requires an act of acquisition. The Gemara asks: Is that to say, by inference, that Rav Huna, according to whose opinion Rabbi Avina acquired the gift, holds that the gift of a person on his deathbed of a portion of his estate does not require an act of acquisition? But don’t we maintain that the gift of a person on his deathbed of a portion of his estate requires an act of acquisition? The Gemara answers: It is different here, as this is not a standard case of the gift of a person on his deathbed. This is a case where one issues an instruction to give the gift due to his imminent death. In that case, the principle: It is a mitzva to fulfill the statement of the deceased, applies even if it is a gift of a portion of his estate.

The Gemara asks: Is that to say by inference that Rabbi Abba holds that one who issues an instruction to give the gift due to his imminent death requires an act of acquisition? But don’t we maintain that one who issues an instruction to give the gift due to his imminent death does not require an act of acquisition? What, then, is difficult for Rabbi Abba?

Rather, this is what is difficult according to Rabbi Abba: Geneiva did not say to give four hundred dinars of wine to Rabbi Avina, and he did not say: The monetary value of four hundred dinars of wine. He said: Four hundred dinars from wine. The question is: What did Geneiva seek to convey with that ambiguous expression? And the other amora, Rabbi Zeira, who does not find this difficult, holds that when Geneiva said: Four hundred dinars from wine, it was in order to enhance Rabbi Avina’s ability to collect the gift. Geneiva sought to give him a gift of value; in order to guarantee that Rabbi Avina would have access to his property and that the heirs would not be able to prevent him from receiving the gift with various claims, he specifically designated from which property Rabbi Avina could collect the gift. The Gemara notes: They sent a message from there, i.e., Eretz Yisrael, that the term: From wine, is in order to enhance Rabbi Avina’s ability to collect the gift.

MISHNA: With regard to one who was thrown into a pit and thought that he would die there, and he said that anyone who hears his voice should write a bill of divorce for his wife, and he specified his name, her name, and all relevant details, those who hear him should write this bill of divorce and give it to his wife, even though they do not see the man and do not know him.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: But let us be concerned that perhaps the source of the voice in the pit is a demon, as no one saw the person in the pit. Rav Yehuda says: It is referring to a case where they saw that the being in the pit has human form.

The Gemara objects: Demons too can appear in human form, and therefore the fact that the being looked human is not a proof that it is not a demon. The Gemara explains: It is a case where they saw that he has a shadow [bavua]. The Gemara objects: Demons also have a shadow. The Gemara explains: It is a case where they saw that he has the shadow of a shadow. The Gemara objects: And perhaps demons too have the shadow of a shadow? Rabbi Ḥanina says: Yonatan my son taught me that demons have a shadow but they do not have the shadow of a shadow.

The Gemara asks: But perhaps the source of the voice in the pit is a rival wife of the woman who is to be divorced. She seeks to cause her rival to receive a bill of divorce under false pretenses, leading her to believe that she is divorced. Based on that mistaken belief, she will remarry without a divorce and will then be forbidden to both her first and second husband. The Gemara answers: A Sage from the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: During a time of danger, when there is the likelihood that the wife would assume deserted wife status, one writes and gives a bill of divorce even though the people instructed to do so are not familiar with the man who gave the instructions. Here too, when a voice is heard from a pit, one writes and gives the bill of divorce, as there is no possibility of properly clarifying the issue.

MISHNA: A healthy man who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, but did not say to give it to her, presumably sought to mock her. Since he told them to write the bill of divorce and not to give it, it is not a valid bill of divorce.

The mishna relates: There was an incident involving a healthy man who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, and then ascended to the roof and fell, and died. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If he fell at his own initiative, taking his own life, it is a valid bill of divorce, as it is clear that he anticipated his death and instructed those listening to write the bill of divorce with the intent of giving it to her. However, if the wind forced him to fall, it is not a valid bill of divorce, as there was no clear intent to give her the bill of divorce.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Was an incident cited to contradict the halakha stated in the mishna? The halakha is that in a case where a healthy man said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, the bill of divorce is not valid. From the incident it is clear that under certain circumstances when a healthy man said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, the bill of divorce is valid.

The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: In the case of a healthy man who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, but he did not say to give it to her, presumably sought to mock her. However, if his ultimate actions prove the nature of his initial intent, that he seeks to give the bill of divorce because he is about to die, it is a valid bill of divorce. And there was an incident involving a healthy man who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, and he then ascended to the roof and fell and died. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If he fell at his own initiative, it is a valid bill of divorce. However, if the wind forced him to fall, it is not a valid bill of divorce.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who entered the synagogue and found a schoolteacher and his son who were sitting there, and another person also sat with them. The man said to them: Two of you should write a bill of divorce for my wife. Ultimately, the schoolteacher died. The Sages considered the following question: Do people designate a son as an agent in the presence of his father, even though the two of them could not serve together as witnesses because they are relatives, or not? As the man’s intent was to designate two people who could serve as witnesses, the schoolteacher and the other person, the question is whether the son of the schoolteacher and the other person are agents and eligible to write and give the bill of divorce.

Rav Naḥman said: People do not designate a son as an agent in the presence of his father. And Rav Pappi said: People designate a son as an agent in the presence of his father. Rava said that the halakha is: People designate a son as an agent in the presence of his father.

MISHNA: If a man said to two people: Give a bill of divorce to my wife,